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Becoming Indigenous: The ‘Speculative Turn’ in Anthropology and the 
(Re)colonization of Indigeneity 
 
David Chandler and Julian Reid 
 
Abstract 
 
The indigenous have become central to contemporary critical and governmental 
imaginaries as the West tries to cope with planetary crises imbricated in the legacies 
of modernity and settler-colonialism. As such, indigenous methods and practices are 
increasingly constructed as offering futural possibilities for ‘becoming’ rather than 
belonging to the archives of an underdeveloped past. Central to this transformation 
has been the speculative or ontological turn in anthropological discourse, which we 
argue has opened up new possibilities for a Western and colonial appropriation of 
indigeneity. This turn is the subject of this article and is critically engaged with to 
pursue a number of avenues which problematise this form of ‘ontopolitical 
anthropology’. The reduction of indigenous lives to the speculative ‘other’ of 
Western modernity inherently tends to reify or ‘exoticise’ indigenous thought and 
practices or, as we state, to ‘ontologize indigeneity’. This, we argue, is particularly 
problematic in the context where critical imaginaries of precarious ‘life in the ruins’ 
tend to affirm contemporary governmental approaches rather than challenge them. 
Ironically, rather than opening up alternative possibilities, these approaches reduce 
the reality of indigenous struggles and sufferings to a mere foil for the speculative 
imaginaries of a privileged white Eurocentric academic elite. 
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Introduction 
 
In this article we seek to highlight the transformation of Western discourses of 
indigeneity as discourses of ‘becoming’. Increasingly, today, indigeneity is 
constructed as futural rather than a mere legacy or product of the past. Just as 
Bruno Latour argues ‘We Have Never Been Modern’,1 so we are told by what we will 
analyse as ‘ontopolitical anthropology’ that the indigenous ‘were never pre-modern’. 
As Elizabeth Povinelli argues, the reduction of indigenous analytics to a form of 
cultural belief was a crucial fiction of ‘setter late liberalism’.2 Indigenous knowledge 
as it is contemporarily constructed in the Western academy is then not pre-modern 
but necessarily post-modern, or after modernity. Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel 
Pedersen state, in their well-cited book, The Ontological Turn: An Anthropological 
Exposition, the turn to ontology in the discipline of anthropology reverses the 
position of the indigenous subject, from being an object of anthropological study to 
enabling a new approach of speculative analytics, placing indigenous thought and 
practices as the ‘analytical starting point’ for the discipline itself.3 As Deborah 
Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro argue, in relation to Amerindian 
collectives: 
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 … their relatively simple technologies that are nonetheless open to high-
 intensity syncretic assemblages, are a “figuration of the future”, not a 
 remnant of the past. Masters of technoprimitivist bricolage and politico-
 metaphysical metamorphosis, they are one of the possible chances, in fact, of 
 a subsistence of the future.4  
 
How indigenous knowledge could be transvalued in terms of ‘becoming’: 
constructed into forms that become futural and post- rather than pre-modern, is the 
subject of this article. We seek to question the ease with which this process of 
transformation or transvaluation has occurred and highlight some problems with 
what we see as a new form of colonization of indigeniety for Western consumption, 
both in terms of the understanding of indigeneity and the stakes for critical 
theorising itself. In doing so, we draw upon leading theorists such as Philippe 
Descola, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Elisabeth Povinelli, Bruno Latour, Donna 
Haraway and Isabelle Stengers, who have each been key to popularising these 
anthropological insights.  
 
The article is organised in four sections. The first engages with the development of 
what we are calling ‘ontopolitical anthropology’, the anthropological production of a 
certain understanding of indigeneity, which rather than challenging the view of 
separate and distinct ‘cultures’ seeks to draw out from the ethnographic experience 
an alternative methodology able to reveal the speculative possibility of ‘different 
worlds’. The second section focuses upon how discourses which seek to transform 
the temporality of indigenous analytics, articulate them as necessary for 
constructing alternative speculative futures. The following section engages more 
closely with debates within anthropology over indigenous analytics, which seek to 
establish indigenous knowledge in a ‘symmetrical’ framing, of equal standing to the 
modernist episteme.5 The final section raises some problems with the approach of 
ontopolitical anthropology, in particular the ways that it can be seen to reify or 
‘exoticise’ indigenous thought and practices or, as we state, ‘ontologize indigeneity’ 
and suggest the possibility of doing anthropology differently. 
 
Ontopolitical Anthropology 
 
Anthropology has a long and chequered history as a ‘science’ of human societal 
differences and has struggled to get away from its racial and colonial heritage.6 
Modern anthropology developed in distinct national ‘schools’, drawing on different 
social and philosophical traditions and was divided between more universalist 
structural or functionalist approaches and more relativist approaches, stressing the 
distinctiveness of separate cultures. The former often operated through analogy 
with Western forms of organisational life, projecting a Western interpretation on to 
non-modern societies, problematically understood to be more ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ 
versions of the West. These approaches were increasingly understood to be 
reductionist, always understanding other cultures on the basis of a single method of 
explanation7 whether through rational choice, the use of behaviouralism or some 
other approach to natural or contextual constraints. The latter approaches, stressing 
cultural difference, which were often informed by post-structuralist positions, were 
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also seen to be problematic, accused of relativising and ‘exoticising’ non-modern 
societies: seeking to understand them on their own terms, reducing cultural 
understandings to processes of language and cognition.8  
 
One response to this dilemma, of universalizing cultural understandings or 
relativizing them, was the ‘hybridization’ position: emphasising the porousness or 
adaptability of cultural boundaries. Culture was not a dead or static aspect but 
always in a state of interactive development and change. Paying attention to the 
realities of indigenous communities meant seeing that they were entangled with 
many pressures, forces and demands of the world. Indigenous communities, like any 
others, were immersed in relations, which they were influenced by and also 
influenced, as Marshall Sahlins noted (back in 1999) when he talked about ‘the 
indigenization of modernity’:9 
 
 The struggle of non-Western peoples to create their own cultural versions of 
 modernity undoes the received Western opposition of tradition vs. change, 
 custom vs. rationality—and most notably its twentieth century version of 
 tradition vs. development.10  
 
It is important to note that ‘indigenous peoples’ are a relatively recent construction, 
emerging from struggles for rights and recognition in the 1970s, primarily led by the 
American Indian Movement (AIM) and the Canadian Indian Brotherhood. 11 
Indigenous struggles in the 1980s became more overtly political as indigenous 
movements were able to gain national and even international political support for 
increased rights and recognition and for opposition to ongoing resource extraction, 
dispossession and displacement. 12  Political theorists were therefore drawn to 
particularly focus on indigenous resistance to the nation-state.13 As indigenous 
peoples became feted as important political actors in their own right, critical 
appropriations of these struggles moved beyond the classist peasant studies of the 
1960s-1980s to embrace more culturalist approaches that appreciated the 
distinctive epistemological and cosmological dimensions of indigenous political 
resistance. Nevertheless, this attention to cultures rejected the idea that cultures 
were somehow fixed or pristine or exotic: 
 
 Cultures are…densely interdependent in their formation and identity. They 
 exist in complex historical processes of interaction with other cultures… 
 Cultural diversity is not a phenomenon of exotic and incommensurable 
 others in distant lands and at different stages of development… interaction 
 and interdependency of cultures is not a recent phenomenon; the cultures of 
 the world have been shaped and formed by interaction for a millennium.14 
  
As political theorist James Tully’s work exemplifies, in the 1990s, Western critical 
academics attempted to highlight the importance of cultural distinctions as a 
pluralising and disruptive force, keeping open the foundational assumptions of 
modernist liberal constitutionalism. 15  The struggles of indigenous groups and 
communities for rights and recognition in the 1980s and 1990s led not to the idea of 
an alternative speculative analytics of ‘becoming’ but to the idea of a plural and 
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globalized world where cultures were living, changing and entangled sets of 
practices and experiences.16 Thus Sahlins’ view of the ‘indigenization of modernity’ 
sought to critique the binaries and hierarchies, which informed the anthropological 
gaze and to problematise the attempt to construct fixed differences and distinctions 
which categorised and essentialised indigenous societies. Critical anthropology thus 
highlighted the essentialising of indigenous cultures and practices under regimes of 
settler-colonialism 17 and problematised the continued reification of indigenous 
culture through ecological and New Age cultural practices.18 
 
Until the late 1990s the marginal position of indigenous peoples meant that for most 
theorists, indigenous communities and indigenous thought were constrained by 
settler-colonialism. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith stated (in 1999) ‘Our colonial experience 
traps us in the project of modernity. There can be no ‘postmodern’ for us until we 
have settled some business of the modern.’19  This is a far cry from contemporary 
interpretations and translations of the power and potential of indigenous 
knowledge. In the 2000s and 2010s an alternative response to the post-structuralist 
or relativist position emerged, one that was informed by debates in continental 
philosophy and focused on moving beyond deconstruction based upon interpretive 
framings of meaning through symbolic interaction and language as representation. 
While for culturalist approaches the emphasis was upon how the abstraction of 
language removed the reality of the world, as signs lost their signification and 
meaning, the ‘ontological’ or ‘ontopolitical’ turn in anthropology sought to ground 
the discipline in the use of ethnographic materials for the production of alternative 
realities. It is here, in making this ‘turn’, that indigenous knowledge as futural 
method became central. In anthropology, this focus managed to evade the 
discipline’s difficulties with reducing the ‘other’ through either a universalist or 
relativist approach: the other was to be no longer the object of knowledge but the 
subject of a new metaphysics of knowing.  
 
This shift of subject positions was enabled through the dismissal of the modernist 
divide between plural and subjective ‘culture’ and universal and objective ‘nature’. 
Contemporary theorists claim that indigenous approaches enable them to solve the 
problems of anthropological methods and to move beyond cultural frameworks of 
analysis in order to take alterity seriously. Literally, the demand of the ontopolitical 
turn in anthropology is to ‘become indigenous’: to take the appearance of the world 
as the starting point for alternative speculative futures. Indigenous knowledge then 
becomes the practice and method of anthropology, deriving from the ontopolitics of 
interpreting what the world itself, in its fluid multiplicity or the ‘liveliness of life’, 
might be enabling, as opposed to how it is constructed by the subject. Here, 
‘becoming indigenous’, as a set of analytics, has as its goal not the understanding of 
indigenous groups or communities as ‘cultures’ but the application of indigenous 
ways of knowing to speculative knowledge-production per se. In this respect, 
ontopolitical anthropology puts indigenous knowledge on the same level as Western 
or modern ways of generating meaning (as we shall analyse later) as a symmetrically 
similar process but with different outcomes.20  
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To put our argument upfront, ontopolitical anthropology makes two essentialising 
moves. Firstly, analytically there is the construction of a strict epistemological and 
ontological division between the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘modern’, or the indigenous 
and the colonial. This binary is one that very much resembles Bruno Latour’s division 
between the ‘Human’ and the ‘Earthbound’.21 This is ontopolitical as there is an 
implicit connection between the epistemological distinctions, i.e. the ways of 
knowing (a process of speculation based upon embodied experience versus an 
abstract process of causal rationalisation) and the ontological underpinnings, i.e. 
what is to be known (a multiverse of speculative possibilities). Here the struggle is 
clear. If anything, it is a little reminiscent of the Cold War articulation of a clear 
divide – geographic, political and ideological - between the ‘capitalist West’ and the 
‘communist East’. Except this time the divide is between the modernist/colonial 
West and allegedly non-modern colonised/‘indigenous communities’. This level of 
crudity in the spatial, ethnographic and epistemic mapping of the world is rarely 
overtly argued in the anthropological literature, and merely smuggled in through the 
exclusive focus on selected indigenous groups and, even then, only certain 
peripheral aspects, such as shamanic practices, held to hold the key to indigenous 
being, for their critical anthropological interlocutors.22  
 
The second move is the extraction of an analytic that can be generalised. The 
analytic is not exactly the same in every case but it can generally be directly mapped 
on to contemporary continental theorising, often claiming authority from dubiously 
reductive readings of the work of Deleuze and Guattari, phenomenology and 
semiotics, or indirectly via posthumanism, actor-network theory, new materialism 
and object-oriented ontology. Ontopolitical anthropology is distinct as a practice in 
that its concern is the generation of an alternative analytics rather than an 
understanding of indigenous life and practices per se. The fact that some academics 
engaged in ontopolitical anthropology (or using the work derived from this) have 
long standing commitments to indigenous struggles and see this work as enabling 
these claims does not detract from what we see as both the problematic nature of 
the underlying political philosophy and the risk of exoticising or ontologizing 
indigeneity itself. 
 
We claim that the indigenous play a vital role for contemporary theorists, not so 
much as objects of study in their own right (old fashioned anthropology) nor as a 
focus of political solidarity (old fashioned politics) but rather as a vicarious stage 
army for critical scholars meeting the fashionable demand to develop non-modern 
approaches to knowledge production. For many critical theorists, feminists, 
posthumanists, new materialists, actor-network theorists and object-oriented 
ontologists, indigeneous thought (as produced through the lens of ontopolitical 
anthropology) plays a fundamental role in supplementing and legitimating their 
experiments in ‘provincializing’ the foundations of Western epistemology in the 
culture/nature divide. This role is one that is largely accidental, based on a particular 
reading and engagement, which constructs indigenous thought as non-Western or 
non-modern, in so far as it allocates agency to non-human actors. We suggest that 
the demand for ontopolitical anthropology is enhanced by the construction of 
indigeneity such that it coincides with the desire of critical theorists to give 
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additional legitimacy to their speculative projects. The irony is that too often these 
theorists end up adopting and strengthening tropes which merely mimic the most 
dominant and disempowering cultural and political forms of our times, instead of 
doing what critique ought to and provide, at the very least, some critical distance 
from and insight into them.23 
 
Anthropology and the Anthropocene 
 
The apparent failure of modernity - allegedly played out in the global warming, 
climate change, species extinction and the ocean acidification of our contemporary 
world - has driven the ‘ontological turn in anthropology as much as, if not more than, 
the discipline’s internal limitations. While modernity was constructed as successful 
the question posed by anthropologists was why indigenous cultures got things 
‘wrong’. As Descola notes: 
 
In ethnographic enquiries, the dualism of nature and culture that the 
observer carries with him thus effectively compels him to approach the 
system of objectification of reality which he studies as a more or less 
impoverished variant of that which is familiar to us, the local system 
ultimately proving to be incapable of completely objectifying our own 
reality.24  
 
By the 2000s, this approach increasingly became displaced through a shift away from 
cultural frameworks of understanding. Now indigenous knowledge was used to show 
how earlier assumptions of Western anthropology got things ‘wrong’. Through 
ontopolitical anthropology, indigenous knowledge became translated into Western 
self-knowledge. This translation is the ground upon which the injunction to ‘become 
indigenous’ is enabled and conditioned.25 The error of Western anthropology was 
not understood to be at the level of epistemology per se, how to know or 
understand indigenous practices, but at the level of ontology: the deeper underlying 
assumption of Western researchers, that nature was objective or universal and that 
culture was subjective and multiple. Thus, for many authors, thinking beyond 
modernity’s limits means ‘becoming indigenous’ through overcoming Western 
‘anthropocentrism’. If ‘Humans’ (with a capital ‘H’) led to the global environmental 
catastrophe of the Anthropocene then ‘the Human’ is the problem that indigenous 
knowledge is to be mobilized against.26   
 
Viveiros de Castro and Danowski argue that the struggle against ‘the Human’ enrols 
Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway and Elizabeth Povinelli,27 thereby 
highlighting that the construction of this modern/indigenous binary involves elite 
figures of the white Western academy (well beyond the discipline of anthropology 
itself) as key interpreters of indigeneity as analytical method. This capacity for critical 
theorists to speak on behalf of the indigenous would not be possible without 
anthropology’s ontopolitical turn, transforming indigeneous knowledge into a 
method or set of analytics available to all. Armed with the understanding of 
indigeneity as method, these anthropologically informed theorists can then anoint 
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themselves as the intellectual gurus, leading the struggles of the indigenous and of 
others, constructed as a collective resistance to the Anthropocene: 
 
 The world “without Man” of this Anthropocene lived in a mode of resistance 
 would thus converge with the world “made of people” of Amerindian 
 cosmologies: Gaia’s definitive transcendence becomes indistinguishable from 
 the originary anthropogeomorphic immanence postulated by the “people of 
 Pachamama”.28  
 
The conceptualisations of ‘Gaia’ of Latour and Stengers and Donna Haraway’s 
imaginary of the ‘Chuthulucene’ stand in as representations, ‘indistinguishable’ from 
the speculative analytics culled from ontopolitical anthropology. These radical critics, 
who seek to reign back innovation and technological development, are unlikely to be 
read as conservative or reactionary if they can succeed in foregrounding the need for 
an ‘indigenous’ alternative on the basis that the left’s view of progress and freedom 
forgets the limits of the environment and its sustainability.29 It also helps their cause 
if they are able to enrol their constructed indigenous stage army against those who 
still harbour illusions in the ‘Human’, with its dreams of ‘progress’.  
 
This is the key trope of ‘becoming indigenous’: indigeneity as the imaginary of a 
speculative future after modernity. It is important to emphasise that the 
Anthropocene plays a fundamentally important role in ‘becoming indigenous’ 
because these speculative analytics depend upon a speculative engagement with the 
present. If we still lived in modernity, then the real struggles of real and 
differentiated indigenous and non-indigenous peoples would have to take centre 
stage, rather than the speculative analytics so beloved of critical theorists in the 
West. However, in the Anthropocene, the dice are loaded in favour of the Western 
academy’s critical theorists and their indigenous imaginary because, or so we are 
informed, the ‘Humans’ ‘have already lost the war; their world is already over.’30  
 
But all is not lost; there is a ‘second chance’. While the modernist world of the 
Human may be over, ‘there are many worlds in the World’, and the Western 
academic interpreters of the indigenous, who have extrapolated their method and 
their analytics, will guide us to these other worlds ‘to come’, because ‘we have a lot 
to learn from these minor peoples who resist in an impoverished world which is not 
even their own any more’.31 ‘Becoming indigenous’ is the slogan less of a resistance 
to modernity and the destruction it is seen to be wreaking upon the world, than of 
an imaginary future that is always immanent in its becoming: 
 
 How can someone desire backwardness as their future? Maybe the scandal 
 has a reason for being: maybe it is impossible historically to go back to being 
 indigenous. But it is perfectly possible – more than that, this is actually 
 taking place – to experience a becoming-indigenous, local and global, 
 particular as well as general; a ceaseless rebecoming-indigenous…32  
 
While Danowski and Viveiros de Castro refer to popular movements in Brazil, they 
also hint at the global struggles against the occupation of the Moderns ‘in Africa, 
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Australasia, Mongolia, in the backstreets and basements of Fortress Europe’.33 But, 
of course, in the Anthropocene, the war against the colonization of the world by 
Moderns and Humans, is not a matter of ethnic essentialism but of a political and 
ethical way of being, held to keep future possibilities open. Once indigeneity is a 
matter of methodology or analytical framing, we are all inculcated in the struggle 
and are required to take sides. The future lies with those who are aware that the 
modernist world is already over. As noted at the start of this article, indigeneity is 
‘not a remnant of the past’: 34 ‘Masters of technoprimitivist bricolage and politico-
metaphysical metamorphosis, they are one of the possible chances, in fact, of a 
subsistence of the future.’35  
 
Indigenous Analytics 
 
Indigenous analytics are held to expand our world, not by adding one more cultural 
perspective, another way of seeing, but by providing a different world after ‘the end 
of the world’.36 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, already cited extensively above, is widely 
seen as the ‘father of anthropology’s ontological turn’37 and his influential book 
Cannibal Metaphysics 38  has been described as ‘the first attempt by a “real” 
anthropologist at doing speculative philosophy on the basis of ethnographic 
materials’.39 It should be emphasised that Viveiros de Castro is not setting out an 
ontology, and to this extent there is often misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘the 
ontological turn’. His is a speculative philosophy, which can much more usefully be 
understood as sharing the approach of speculative realism. The speculative realist 
position is well set out by Quentin Meillassoux, who argues that since Immanuel 
Kant’s division of the world between the noumenal world (the world ‘in itself’, which 
is independent of us) and the phenomenal world (which is the world as we 
experience and perceive it) the modernist episteme has focused upon knowledge as 
always a product of our relation to the world, as a correlation between the thinking 
subject and the world as it is apprehended by that subject, as it is given to thought. 
Meillassoux calls this ‘correlationism’: the fact that ‘we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart 
from the other’.40 
 
‘Correlationism’, as a modernist episteme, is held to separate the subject from the 
world, making the world inaccessible. Man is in the world but trapped in 
consciousness and language ‘as in a transparent cage’, where ‘Everything is outside, 
yet it is impossible to get out.’41 For Meillassoux, speculative thought enables an 
escape from this modernist cage, enabling critical theorists to take the world more 
seriously again, rather than merely focusing on the intersubjective construction of 
meanings. Taking the world more seriously means speculating on a reality that is 
independent of human thought and thereby opening up to ‘a great outdoors’.42 This 
speculative framing posits being as the key to thought, rather than prioritising 
thought. As Elisabeth Povinelli argues, this inverses the modernist conception which 
always prioritises thought, the subject and life and denies agency to ‘Nonlife’.43 For 
Ray Brassier, along with Meillassoux one of the most influential speculative realists, 
speculative realism would allow being to dethrone the power of thought; instead, 
 9 
thought’s limits would ‘index the autonomy of the object in its capacity to turn 
thought into a thing’.44  
 
It is Viveiros de Castro who has brought Amerindian ‘perspectivism’ and ‘multi-
naturalism’ to the centre of anthropological thinking on indigeneity as a 
performative example of the application of a speculative method. In Amerindian 
cosmology, different beings have fundamentally different perspectives on the world, 
but share the same forms of ‘soul’ or cognition. All types of being see themselves as 
humans and see other types of being according to their own affordances and ways of 
being, normally related to their relational status as predator or prey.45 The practice 
of shamanism foregrounds this ‘perspectivism’ as the shaman can cross the barrier 
between species and become an interlocutor able to take on the perspective or 
point of view of other beings to understand their intentions or will.46 It is this 
framing that enables Viveiros de Castro to translate Amerindian culture into the 
terminology of Deleuzian or vital materialist speculative philosophy. But, more 
importantly, this highlights that for ontopolitical anthropology, perspectivism is a 
method or set of analytics that seeks to go beyond ‘correlationism’. Rather than 
being imprisoned in a ‘transparent cage’, ‘perspectivism’ enables the world to be 
grasped through speculative shifts of perspective to those of other beings, with 
other embodied ways of knowing. 
 
Whereas in the modern ontology, scientific knowledge seeks to reduce objects or 
occurrences to objective outcomes of causal chains of interconnection, ‘Amerindian 
epistemological convention follows the inverse principle, which is that an object is an 
insufficiently interpreted subject.’47 Objects, to be known, have to become subjects, 
replete with individual intentionality and wills. The sphere of ‘nature’ as brute facts 
or mechanical causation is drastically reduced and the sphere of ‘culture’ or of 
subjectivity and agency becomes much greater. This increase in ‘perspectives’ should 
not be confused with epistemological relativism; Viveiros de Castro argues that this 
is an ontological perspectivism as perspectives are correct or true for different forms 
of being.48 
 
It is the distinctions between ontological forms of being that make this form of 
perspectivism ‘multinatural’: ‘different kinds of being see the same things 
differently’.49 The difference is not in different forms of representation as the 
perspective is a product of the affordances of the body not of the mind. There is one 
way of knowing – or one culture – but each form of life knows its world differently. 
There is no thing ‘in-itself’ somehow outside these multiple perspectives.50 ‘Every 
point of view is “total”, and no point of view knows its like or equivalent.’51 Every 
‘thing’ is thereby many things at once, in superposition, thus: ‘The indigenous theory 
of perspectivism emerges from an implicit comparison between the ways the 
different modes of corporeality “naturally” experience the world as affective 
multiplicity.’52  
 
Viveiros de Castro presents a speculative method of using indigenous ethnographic 
materials to inverse the modernist episteme, thus bringing indigenous thought to 
the same level as modernist thought. But, of course, this framing is not merely 
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derived from the indigenous themselves; the point is to extract speculative 
philosophy from them: 
 
 The philosophy of Deleuze… is where I found the most appropriate machine 
 for retransmitting the sonar frequency that I had picked up from Amerindian 
 thought. Perspectivism and multinaturalism, which are, again, objects that 
 have been resynthesized by anthropological discourse (indigenous theories, I 
 dare say, do not present themselves in such conveniently pre-packaged 
 fashion!), are the result of the encounter between a certain becoming-
 Deleuzian of Amerindian ethnology and a certain becoming-Indian of Deleuze 
 and Guattari’s thought – a becoming-Indian that decisively passes… through 
 the chapter concerning becomings in A Thousand Plateaus.53  
 
The key point for ontopolitical anthropology is that indigenous analytics opens up 
the speculative potential of the world. As Viveiros de Castro argues, this shares much 
with the “symmetric” epistemology of Bruno Latour: ‘in which knowing is no longer a 
way of representing the unknown but of interacting with it, i.e., a way of creating 
rather than contemplating, reflecting, or communicating’. 54  This is not ‘an 
interpretation’ of Amerindian thought, but rather an ‘experimentation’ with it, 
beginning by ‘affirming the equivalence, in principle, of anthropological and 
indigenous discourse’.55 This is creative for Viveiros de Castro, leaning on Latour, as: 
‘The task of knowledge is no longer to unify diversity through representation but, as 
Latour again puts it, of “multiplying the agents and agencies populating our 
world”.’56  
 
This approach, of ‘symmetrical anthropology’,57 argues that indigenous knowledge 
speculatively brings new agents and actants into being in ways which could be 
understood as no different from the natural sciences: ‘it locates Moderns and non-
Moderns on the same plane and proposes to consider identically all the collectives 
within which the repartitions between beings and properties are at work’.58 Latour 
argues that there should be no distinction between the two methods and that both 
are equally valid:59 ‘All nature-cultures are similar in that they simultaneously 
construct humans, divinities and nonhumans.’60 As Descola puts it: 
 
 In denying to modern dualism the structuring function that it had hitherto 
 been granted, in emphasizing that, everywhere and always, humans enlist 
 crowds of nonhumans in the fabric of communal life, symmetrical 
 anthropology places on an equal footing Amazonian tribes and biological 
 laboratories, pilgrimages to Our Lady and synchrotrons.61  
 
While the position of treating indigenous knowledge as method can enable equating 
it with modernist knowledge it has also been used to provincialise modernist 
approaches further, particularly in the context of the Anthropocene. For these 
approaches, most notably, that of Descola, the modern episteme becomes just one 
of four ways of understanding the relationship between culture and nature.62 Or, 
even more directly, for Viveiros de Castro: ‘If real philosophy abounds in imaginary 
savages, anthropological geophilosophy makes imaginary philosophy with real 
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savages’.63 While the speculative nature of the philosophy is fairly straight forward, 
the idea of ‘real savages’ (no matter how ‘playfully’ it may be articulated) as the 
claimed basis for a particular brand of metaphysics is problematic. As Bassire and 
Bond state, despite the claims of Viveiros de Castro, Latour and Descola to evading 
metaphysical or ontological claims about the nature of reality, essentialising 
regularly slips in with the association of certain ways of thinking with ethnic groups 
and communities.64 This problem is highlighted by Brazilian anthropologist Alcida 
Rita Ramos, who argues that the crude binaries at work in perspectivist approaches, 
inspired by de Castro’s work, are ‘essentialist’ and ‘exoticizing’, diminishing the 
intellectual value of indigenous thinking by making it a foil for projecting Western 
thought:65 
 
 … abdicating the central role of ethnographic research as a means to arrive 
 at a deeper understanding of and respect for indigenous peoples… as a 
 theory, perspectivism is, at best, indifferent to the historical and political 
 predicament of indigenous life in the modern world. It may be fair to say that 
 the more extensive and deeper ethnographic knowledge is, the less arrogant 
 we become and the more clearly we perceive the folly of projecting our 
 theoretical ambitions on indigenous peoples.66  
 
Ontologising Indigeneity 
 
The role of the speculative analytics of the ‘indigenous’ in much contemporary 
critical theory is to lend substance to the critical and speculative desire to ‘challenge 
the coloniality of knowledge’ itself,67 which is a substantially different focus than the 
coloniality of real inequalities and injustices in the world. Indigenous knowledge is, in 
these framings, not about a method of struggle or about justifications for land rights 
and resources but very specifically about knowledge-production itself, or as Viveiros 
de Castro writes, ‘conceptual self-determination’. It is a generalizable analytic or 
practice of knowledge production, specifically for the use of non-indigenous 
theorists.68 Yet, for some, the price is too high to pay in terms of what we are calling 
the ‘ontologisation’ of indigeneity itself. As Descola himself notes, in relation to Tim 
Ingold’s approach to the indigenous as illustrating an ‘ontology of dwelling’: 
 
 While such a position is entirely legitimate as a philosophical profession of 
 faith, it is hardly so on the anthropological plane which Ingold aims to 
 occupy. It simply inverses the common ethnocentric prejudice: it is no longer 
 the animism of archaic peoples that appears as an incomplete version or 
 clumsy prefiguration of the true objectification of reality as Moderns 
 establish it, but it is rather this very objectification that appears as a 
 monstrous outgrowth dissimulating the truth of the primordial experience of 
 the world, of which the hunter-gatherers assisted by phenomenology, give us 
 a better account.69  
 
The critical injunction to ‘become indigenous’ should be understood as an injunction 
to take up a particular way of being in the world: to have a particular ethic of being, 
a particular form of critical stance. At the close of (critical anthropologists) Martin 
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Holbraad and Morten Pedersen’s recent book The Ontological Turn 70  this is 
articulated well. Becoming indigenous can thus be understood to be an open-ended 
critical project, where the world itself becomes the critical subject or agency and the 
critical theorist or activist is not attempting to impose themselves upon the world 
but rather to become a facilitator or enabler in speculatively letting the world speak 
back to power, hegemony and limits. The task of critique then is ‘not unlike an artist 
probing and sensing her way through the bundle of forces that the affordance of her 
materials enable or even compels her to release’.71 The task of critical anthropology 
is to ‘intensely abstract conceptual scaling or “sculpting” that works by eliciting 
certain dynamics and potentials present “within things” into intensified versions of 
these things themselves’.72 The task of critique is to make the world more ‘alive’, 
more real and intense.73 
 
Indigenous knowledge as method or as analytic becomes a tool to be universalized 
for a new ‘post-critical’ ethic of care. As Holbraad and Perdersen accurately observe, 
becoming indigenous thus becomes an alternative to earlier ethics of critique. It is a 
far cry from the old left doctrinaires who proclaimed that they had divined a single 
and absolute truth of the world that they would disseminate and implement through 
the party. It is also very different to the post-Marxist left’s critique through 
deconstruction, attempting to reveal the hegemonic forces behind truth claims and 
to remove the grounds of certainty.74 The construction of indigenous knowledge as 
critique seeks to articulate constructive or positive alternatives through drawing 
them out from the world itself. The problem, of course, is that these self-
aggrandising claims of critical theorists and activists ‘representing’ or ‘giving voice’ to 
the world, the environment, or mountains and rivers can easily sound like the height 
of white or colonial hubris.  
 
The construction of indigenous knowledge as an analytic available for export to 
Western critical activists and theorists therefore becomes vital for the viability of 
these (otherwise deeply problematic) claims. We call the production of indigeneous 
knowledge in these terms ‘ontopolitical’ as it grounds a new ethic of politics, not in 
the needs and desires of the political subject but allegedly in the world itself or 
rather in its speculative affordances. In alleging that ‘post-critique’ works on the 
basis of the ‘conceptual affordances present in a body of ethnographic materials’, 
Holbraad and Pedersen argue that indigenous analytics ‘imply a peculiarly non- or 
anti-normative stance’.75 Rather than ‘a means to externally defined political ends’ 
they claim that this approach is ‘a political end in its own right’.76 This is because 
indigenous analytics of bringing the world to life on its own terms and intensifying 
these is ‘oriented towards the production of difference, or “alterity”, as such’.77 Here 
the critical anthropological imaginary takes on nearly God-like features: 
 
 Regardless… of the political goals to which it may lend itself, anthropology is 
 ontologically political inasmuch as its operation presupposes, and is an 
 attempt experimentally to ‘do’, difference as such: the politics of indefinitely 
 sustaining the possible, the ‘could be’. It is an anthropology, then, that is 
 analytically anti-authoritarian, making it its business to generate vantages 
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 from which established forms of thinking are put under relentless pressure 
 by alterity itself, and perhaps changed.78  
 
The critical politics of anthropology armed with indigenous analytics is that of 
enabling the critical but latent power of ‘alterity itself’. Here we see the full hubris of 
ontopolitical anthropological thought in its pretence to write the subject out of 
critique and replace it with life itself, understood as the ceaseless differentiating 
power of ‘alterity’. Western anthropologists have replaced the hubris of the 
modernist ‘God’s eye view from nowhere’79 with the no-less hubristic God’s eye 
view from everywhere, from life itself.80 This is a transformation in the form of 
knowing while maintaining its hierarchical content, through (once again) erasing the 
positionality of the anthropologist as knowing subject. It is achieved through the 
engagement with and transvaluation of indigenous knowledge. 
 
One problem we have with taking at face value the articulation of indigenous 
knowledge as method is that it effaces the reality of being indigenous. Indigeneity is 
transformed into a fictive way of being and knowing that has nothing to do with the 
rich plurality of the lived life of indigenous groups, and everything to do with the 
imagination of its white Western author. This exoticisation of indigenous knowledge 
is widely prevalent in critical theory.  
 
A good example of how the reality of indigenous being is effaced in the white, 
predominantly Western fantasy of ‘becoming indigenous’, can be encountered in the 
work of Donna Haraway, one of the most well known and widely cited critical 
scholars of the present. Haraway’s recent book, Staying with the Trouble, reveals a 
lot about the problems with the expropriation of indigenous knowledge as 
method.81 The final chapter ends with a story she made up at a speculative narration 
workshop,82 of a migratory people she names, the Children of Compost. The Children 
of Compost, like many other peoples of the future, as she tells her readers,  ‘felt 
moved to migrate to ruined places and work with human and nonhuman partners to 
heal these places, building networks, pathways, nodes, and webs of and for a newly 
habitable world.’83 A community that migrates in order to heal, the Children of 
Compost, vaguely but not exclusively indigenous, understood its task of learning to 
live on a damaged planet to involve reducing ‘radically the burdens of human 
numbers across the earth’.84 They understood that human biological reproduction is 
to be discouraged; ‘New children must be rare and precious.’85  
 
This imaginary migrant community of healers embody the imperative Haraway ends 
her book with, ‘Make Kin Not Babies’. 86  While biological reproduction is 
‘discouraged’ by the Children of Compost, when it does happen there is an 
obligation of the person carrying the pregnancy ‘to choose an animal symbiont for 
the new child’.87 Every newborn comes into being as a symbiont with an animal 
belonging to another ‘actively threatened species’. 88  The animal symbionts 
themselves are also ‘generally members of migratory species’89 and the education of 
the children centers on ‘learning how to live in symbiosis so as to nurture the animal 
symbiont’.90 Because the animals in question are migratory so that education entails 
teaching the child how to live in the nodes, pathways and corridors where 
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migrations happen.91 Haraway narrates the five-generational story of Camille, one of 
the Children of Compost, whose people ‘allied themselves with struggling 
multispecies communities in the rugged mountains and valleys’ of the Appalachian 
Mountains of West Virginia.92 Camille’s parent chose the Monarch butterfly to be 
her animal symbiont, so that she ‘would grow in knowledge’ of how to sustain the 
life of this particularly threatened species, which in turn meant learning how to 
sustain the practices of migration by which the Monarch lives, as her contribution to 
the life of her people, in their work to make multispecies partnerships flourish and 
build ‘a habitable earth in sustained troubled times’.93  
 
Haraway’s speculative analytic asks us to imagine a people of the future, a people 
that she, as the critical theorist, would wish to exist. This is a people attuned to the 
history of indigenous struggles, unable to imagine that it could inhabit or move to 
‘empty land’, because it is already well versed in the ‘destructive fictions of settler 
colonialism’.94 Her story is a dedicated attempt to put into practice what she calls a 
‘proindigenous’ and ‘nonsettler’ approach to ‘disabling the pretensions of human 
exceptionalism’.95 The speculative embodiment of this pro-indigenous and non-
settler approach to life and being, the young child Camille, dedicates herself to giving 
the migrations of the butterflies ‘a chance to have a future in a time of mass 
extinction’.96 The migrations of the non-human life in question are the actual objects 
of Camille’s life of dedicated work and care, we are to suppose. Her life’s work 
happens ‘almost entirely along the corridors and in the towns, fields, mines, woods, 
coasts, mountains, deserts, and cities of the great eastern and western monarch 
migrations’ and she sojourns with the insects ‘in the winter homes of the western 
migration of the monarchs’.97 She studies with ‘Native American, First Nation, and 
Métis teachers’ so as to do her work in support of the migrations.98 She is ‘well read 
in decolonial and postcolonial literatures’ and yet still struggling with the 
consequences of her own people’s inheritance of practices of conservation from 
settler colonialism.99 
 
Camille’s way of shedding that inheritance is to embrace the practices of the 
indigenous peoples from who she learns. Indeed the ethos of ‘becoming indigenous’ 
is at the heart of the story of Camille. Her people use medical science to transfer 
genetic materials from animal to human, enabling a shamanic sensitivity to the 
world that remaining merely human could not. Supplemented with their genetic 
material, Camille was able to understand ‘the biological, cultural, historical worlds of 
these clusters of [M]onarch [butterflies]’. 100  Crucially this human-non-human 
symbiosis required the skill set of indigenous knowledge: 
 
 Of course, as an important component of [Camille]’s education and working 
 alliances as both child and adult, Camille 1 had studied with Native American, 
 First Nation, and Metis teachers, who explained and performed diverse 
 practices and knowledges for conjoined human and other-than-human 
 becoming and exchange.101  
 
Here the posthuman Camille needs the assistance of the indigenous skills in order to 
let go ‘of colonialist notions of religion and secularism’ and ‘begin to appreciate the 
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sheer semiotic materiality’ of the world.102 In fact, the further down the line of 
future posthuman generations Camille goes, the more indigenous knowledge as 
method is necessary as an enabling factor. Camille 5, the last in the narrative time-
span is trained in Susan Harding’s ‘experimental animism’103 and in Viveiros de 
Castro’s multinaturalism and perspectivism.104 The Camille Stories are literally the 
white liberal fantasy tale of becoming posthumanly attuned to nature through 
‘becoming indigenous’. 
 
We are not the first to raise the problem of ‘exoticism’. As Bessire and Bond state: 
‘the apparent fusion of nature and culture attributed to indigenous peoples is itself a 
long-standing conceit whose genealogy can be traced to colonial property regimes in 
which the commons was assigned to Indians while private property was reserved for 
Spaniards’, 105  However, the problem of exoticism is often misunderstood as 
somehow giving indigenous groups a special insight into non-modern ontologies and 
epistemologies. This is not really the case. In fact, it could be argued that the reality 
is worse. One problem that the advocates of indigenous knowledge as method face 
is why the arguments and frameworks that they derive from their ‘ethnographic 
experiences on the ground’ always ends up being very similar to what white 
European theorists have been arguing for decades. Therefore the anthropological 
promise that indigenous analytics can enable the infinite variety of life’s alterity to 
emerge, in a challenge to West’s colonial hegemony, seems rather disingenuous. 
These decolonial and postcolonial anthropologists might just as well have stayed at 
home and attended workshops on speculative narration.  
 
A typical example occurs in the work of Marisol de la Cadena, at the University of 
California, Davis, who states that she is taking her cue from Isabelle Stengers106 in 
developing a ‘multinatural’ cosmopolitics, centred on the alternative ontology of 
indigeneity. Here’s a sense of how these ‘cosmopolitical’ sensitivities work out on 
the ground, as she describes two of her interlocutors: 
 
 Graciano Mandura (Major of Ocongate, bilingual in Quechua and Spanish, 
 holding a university degree) and Nazario Turpo (pampamisayoq in Ocongate, 
 monolingual Quechua speaker, and not knowing how to read or write) 
 participate in indigeneity from two different positions—one more capable 
 through literacy, the other better able to interact with other-than-human 
 beings—but both connected to the worlds that their lives make less than 
 two.107  
 
The ease with which the differentiation between different indigenous perspectives is 
understood in the most essentialising terms – literacy equals modernist ontology 
separating nature and culture/ illiteracy equals non-modern ontology ‘better able to 
interact with other-than-human beings’ - would be shocking if it was not written in 
good coin by a well respected ontopolitical anthropologist. Once again repeating all 
the hoary colonial prejudices already rehearsed in Haraway and Stenger’s 
speculative fiction workshop.  
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Holbraad and Pedersen, to their credit, take up the challenge, asking: ‘Should we 
take the similarities between ontological turn-style analyses as an indication that the 
ethnographic situations that precipitate them are not, after all, as different from 
each other as we might imagine?’108 The idea that all across the world the 
anthropological experience might be the same clearly doesn’t say much for the 
discipline’s investigative powers or ability to uncover new ways of thinking and 
doing! If this latter view, that anthropological investigation itself was the source of 
this similarity, were to be true, then they argue: ‘This would be dismal, since it would 
effectively amount to the ontological turn admitting that its prime task, that of 
creating the conditions for ethnographic differences to make a difference, had 
effectively failed.’109  
 
The ‘convergence’ of Western critical thinking, informed through the ‘ontopolitical 
turn’ in anthropology thus celebrates indigenous knowledge at the same time as 
denying an indigenous voice independent of this ‘methodological’ framing. As 
Bessire and Bond argue, this is: 
 
 …what makes the implications of ontological anthropology so problematic. 
 The paradox is this: Although it poses as a mechanism to promote the 
 “ontological self-determination of peoples” by “giving the ontological back 
 to the people”, multinaturalist ontology cannot be taken as a general 
 description of actually existing Indigenous being without becoming ensnared 
 in empirical contradictions. The only way it can often be sustained is by a 
 targeted erasure of ethnographic evidence and an artificial standardization of 
 alterity itself.110  
 
They continue:  
 
 Is there anything more banally modern than that orthodox dialectic of 
 Otherness wherein Indigenous ontological legitimacy is restricted to the 
 terms of an alterity grounded in myth with which many do not agree and 
 from which many are always already excluded?... To unsettle one modern 
 binary, he or she must presume the validity of another: the 
 incommensurability of the modern and the nonmodern.’111  
 
The problem of exoticism is precisely that critical anthropologists, so keen to distil 
indigenous knowledge as method or analytics, reduce their field studies to an 
homogenous whole: one which seems very much based on their readings of 
contemporary US and European writers engaged with ontological and 
epistemological problems with dubious relevance to the struggles of indigenous 
communities. Rather than facilitating and enabling any plural or differential power of 
life to inform their critical perspectives, the project of extracting indigenous 
knowledge as a fungible method or analytic for Western critical theorists reduces 
indigenous societies and practices to mere props or backstops for the story of how 
the anthropologists themselves operate to ‘do difference differently’.  
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Critical anthropological work can, of course, engage with indigeneity in other, more 
self-reflexive, ways. Were these anthropologists to engage with the actual politics of 
indigenous struggles for security in the world they would have to encounter the 
limits and contradictions of their own truth claims. Take, for example, the Inuit of 
Nunavut, Canada, who are currently engaged in a dispute with the colonial State of 
Canada over what to do about migratory polar bears. The Inuit claim that there are 
too many polar bears in Nunavut and that they pose a risk to human wellbeing. In 
the summer of last year, 2018, this indigenous claim was borne out when one Inuit, 
Aaron Gibbons was killed defending his children from a bear. 112 The Inuit claim that 
because there are too many polar bears in Nunavut so it is their right to cull them.113 
This is in contrast to the claims of colonial scientists that bear populations are in 
decline and threatened with extinction. There is a significant clash taking place in 
Nunavut between real Inuit knowledge, which indicates that bear populations are 
increasing and that climate change poses no threat to the bears’ well being, and that 
of Western biological knowledge which argues that the opposite is true. The Inuit of 
Nunavut have no interest in fostering one of Haraway’s ‘multispecies partnerships’ 
with polar bears, nor with receiving its genetic material. By contrast they want to 
hunt and slaughter the bears in defence of their own human security.  
   
Conclusion 
 
Rather than merely ‘exoticising’ indigenous practices, we argue that critical or 
ontopolitical anthropology goes further to ‘objectify’ its subject matter. In treating 
indigenous knowledge as method or analytics the theorists analysed above, in fact, 
reduce indigenous peoples to the level of any other object or appearance in the 
world that catches their attention and then becomes used to enable their own 
creative critical capacities. When Holbraad and Pedersen, for example, argue that 
they also want to treat things in the same way as they treat indigenous practices this 
‘objectification’ becomes clearer. The anthropological respect for the ‘conceptual 
self-determination’ of indigenous people is thus no different from their ‘respect’ for 
any other object. Thereby, indigenous knowledge as analytics does not make 
practices or things more ‘exotic’ but rather ‘objectifies’ the world to being merely a 
set of transmutable effects available for the speculative anthropological 
imagination.114 In effect, indigenous analytics empties the world of things of all 
meaningful content, reducing the world to a mere foil for speculative thought.  
 
We find the conflation of a very white, very Western, very Eurocentric concern with 
the crisis of the modern episteme with the real political and life struggles of 
indigenous groups and communities for security and freedom from colonialism to be 
dishonest and, indeed, parasitical. This conflation happens through a specific form of 
‘translation’, through which radical Western conceptual critique becomes 
reconstructed through the injunction to ‘become indigenous’. This process of 
‘becoming indigenous’ is not the fantasy of literally pretending to be indigenous, nor 
is it a political act of solidarity with indigenous struggles for rights, land or resources. 
The indigeneity at stake in anthropology’s desire to ‘become indigenous’ is the 
imaginary product of a white liberal and colonial fantasy. From being forms of 
culture and knowledge that once demanded respect from a distance, indigeneity is 
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hereby reduced to a ‘transferable skill set’ that white people can learn from and 
adopt for themselves. This is the reality of colonialism today. 
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